In the next few years, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) plans to demonstrate two concepts for air-launched hypersonic weapons (HSW): the concept of turbocharged gliding and aspirated hypersonic weapons. Although these systems are not weapons themselves, they should generate rich information about the operating conditions of armed aircraft flying at high altitudes at hypersonic speeds (Mach 5 to 10), and combined with other government-funded research work can pave the way The way the road is planned for the next ten years.
Other countries are also developing HSW. Russia is developing zircon, a ship-borne hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), which is reportedly partly derived from the BrahMos, a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile developed by Russia and India. It is also developing a ballistic missile launch system with a hypersonic gliding vehicle.
Russia and China are developing high-speed missiles launched by ballistic missiles. Russia recently launched a hypersonic gliding vehicle on the SS19 intercontinental ballistic missile. Since 2014, China has tested DFZF (formerly WU14), a hypersonic gliding vehicle that can be launched by ballistic missiles of various sizes. The development of
conventional hypersonic weapons provides opportunities and challenges for US defense planners. Opponents with advanced air defense systems. The introduction of air-launched HSW can allow aircraft to target short-term moving targets from the form separation range, such as surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and ballistic and cruise missile launchers. To their long flight time. HSW can also endanger tightly defended targets that are difficult to hit with subsonic weapons. The ultra-high speed, high-altitude flight profile and maneuverability of HSW can reduce the chance of threat participation and improve survivability and weapon effectiveness. The HSW acquisition may also force potential adversaries to develop new air defense systems or redeploy existing air defense systems in response to this threat, and may increase the effectiveness of other air assets. Of course, other solutions are also possible. Supersonic weapons (Mach 1 to 5) can also effectively attack these targets, which must also be taken into account. The status of HSWs launched by 4,444 ballistic missiles, especially ICMs launched from the United States, is unclear. Purchasing such a system would provide a means to strike targets around the world from US territory in 30 minutes. However, such a launch may be misinterpreted as a nuclear-armed ICBM launch and therefore may have a significant upgrade risk. Additionally, war zones may require intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to uncover many targets of interest. If the ISR system is available, so can the attacker. Attack aircraft can provide a cheaper, more customizable, and more powerful way to engage targets. Therefore, while these weapons may have some utility, it is unclear whether they are profitable or outweigh their risks.
Even the air-launched HSW has great limitations. Reaching very high speeds and heights requires a lot of energy and advanced materials. Therefore, HSW may be larger, heavier, and more expensive than subsonic weapons with similar payload and range. Therefore, they will never be able to compete with the current target system, and both can effectively hit the target.
Although it is too early for the United States to decide to purchase HSW at this time, flight demonstrations and technical maturity efforts can pave the way for the development of new weapon systems.
Whether or not the United States buys HSW, it may be forced to develop defensive measures. Defeating the Zircon system may require attacking several steps in the opponent's chain of effects. This may include destroying or dazzling Russian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to prevent them from detecting warships, disrupting communication links between the ISR system and HS-equipped surface vessels, and attacking these vessels. Efforts to deceive or blind missile seekers and destroy the missile itself may also be necessary. For decades, the Navy has adopted systems designed to defeat supersonic anti-ship missiles. These types of systems need to be scaled up to address the threat posed by zircon.
Introducing Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles to launch HSW may pose a broader set of challenges, because it is conceivable that they could be used to strike multiple surface targets. The Chinese HSW will be more expensive than similar subsonic cruise missiles and can therefore be reserved for well-defended high-value targets such as ships and critical infrastructure.
Resolving this threat may also require attacks at multiple stages of the opponent's chain of effects. The fact that these weapons can be launched from mobile ground systems has proven difficult to find and attack in previous conflicts, which only adds to the challenge. Air defense systems, such as theater air defense and missile defense systems, may also need to be upgraded.
It is impossible to intercept all missiles. The attacker chooses the time and the amount of missiles used to attack each target. Defenders must assign defenses before attacking, so these defenses can be overwhelmed in specific locations. Mitigation measures, such as hardening some key facilities and establishing backups for other facilities, can make operations more robust against attack.
Although the United States, Russia, and China are all developing hypersonic systems, and Russia and China seem to be developing hypersonic weapons, it is wrong to regard them as an arms race. No matter what actions other countries take, the United States must decide whether to develop and acquire HSW based on its potential contribution in future conflicts. Similarly, if Russian and Chinese HSW systems are put into use, regardless of whether the United States decides to purchase its own HSW, defense planners must respond to the threats posed by these systems.